CHAPTER XII

LINCOLN AND McCLELLAN.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN, as we have seen, had, before he was taken ill, begun to consider the desirability of availing himself of the facilities presented by the water-front of the State of Virginia in transporting his army from the immediate neighborhood of Washington to the immediate neighborhood of Richmond, where he could be supplied by transports with all needed ammunition and subsistence. The advantages of water-communication were many and obvious. We have spoken of this subject before, in connection with General Buell's proposed movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.[1] There was in the nature of things no reason why these advantages should not be as eagerly availed of in one theatre of war as in another, if the other conditions of the problem were equally favorable. At first Bight, it was as tempting to send a strong force up the James to threaten Richmond, with the expectation of inducing the precipitate evacuation of Manasaas and even of Richmond itself, as to move upon Fort Donelson with the intention of forcing Sidney

[1] *Ante*, 183.